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ROAD TO PEACE 
by Joseph Clark 
Geneva: Road to Peace 
By JOSEPH CLARK 
On many monuments and churches in Geneva you read the words: 
From the Darkness the Light. 
Who can deny that the Geneva conferu1cc, wbich brought to- 
gether President Eisenhower, Prerniws Bulganin and Fame and Prime 
Minister Eden, cast a light which pierced the darkness of "the 
&Id War"? 
Estimates vary about how much was actually achieved by the 
Big Four wn£erence. Some might dispute a headlint in tht Daily 
S&ch, of London, after the conference: REJOICEI THE DAYS OF 
WAR ARE PASTI 
But even the cautious statement of President Eisenhower on his 
return from Geneva, said: "There is evidence of a new frien&incss 
in the world." He added something that is quite new for the Ad- 
ministration-that any negotiations must involve mutual concessions. 
British Foreign Minister Harold Maurnillan said jovially when he 
was back in London: "There sin? gmna be any war." 
French Premier Faure said the codrenee "will have a happy 
influence" on future events. 
Soviet Premier Bulganin deckred the conferen= contributed "to 
the relaxation of tensions between He also said Geneva "opeus 
a new era in the relations among the four powers, and not only 
among them." 
Best of d we like the comment of an Iowa fa- who was having 
his own *rconference" with some visiting Soviet farm experts, while 
the Big Four met in Geneva. 
PsrMi~hed by NEW CENTURY PUBLISHERS, 83a Broadway, N. Y. 3 N. Y. 
September, 1955 -srub PRINTED IN THB UAA. 
"People out here," the Iowan said, "and probably in the rest of . 
the country, too, arc sick and tired of talk about war and interna- 
tional tension. We art williag to do just about everything to get rid 
of it. If getting to know sarntthmg h u t  the Russians is necessary, 
then we want to do tha~" 
At the bar in the huge Maisw De La P m  (How of the Press) 
a reporter .from a mid-west paper asked me what I thought abut 
the codcreace. This was just after the &st day. I said it lwked 
he: and noted that President B i o w e r  ah said it was going h e ,  
''Just words," my colleague said, "the Russians haven't given up 
their aim of world conqu~t" There it &C argument M i n d  
nearly ten years of cold war. However, now for the first time in ten 
years M c a n  and Soviet heads of government wcxc sitting down to- 
gether. Can we have peace with the Russians? Here's how President 
Eisenhower answerad that w the third day of the conhence: 
"I have spoken to each m e m k  of the Russian delegation. I wish 
to make it c h  it is my belief h a t  they art as mrnestly desirous 
of W g  peace as we are." 
Now, that's a lot different from what we've heard ever since the 
end of the war. One correspondent for a big metropolitan newspaper 
said in all seriousness that Eisenhower was spreading "mmmunist 
propaganda:' Which gives you an idea of how unprepared the big 
business press was for the conciliatory atmosphere and spirit of good 
f&g at Geneva In fact, up till the h t  day their favorite word w;ts 
"deadlcck." 
These correspondents bad fallen for their own omria abut immi- 
4eot and inevitable war, A most notable result of the Geneva con- 
ference was that it e x p d  the terrible hoax to which wr country 
had been subjected for so marry years-the hoax of imminent and in- 
evitable war, and of an external menace. 
Naturally, h e  Geneva conference didn't settle all the Wcrences 
and wnflicts that have arisen in the last ten years. Six days is a 
short rime to undo the: harm of ten tima days. Here we propst 
to discuss the unsettled questions and examine rhc pokbilities of 
getting satisfactory results. But first let's sce how the Geneva confer- 
ence came about in the h t  place and why it didn't take place sooner. 
Btfore the Geneva confuence, this Jdy, there had not hen a meet- 
ing of the American and Soviet heads of state since Jdy, r* Ccr- 
tainly it wasn't for lack of difhences md codicol By the end of 1 9 ~  
serious disputes had developed between our country and the USS&. 
abwt Germany, about Korea, and about atomic weapons. 
On May + 1gq8, our ambassador in Moscow, Gen. Walter Bedell 
Smith, informed Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov that he deplored the 
bad relations. h d o r  Smith said: "As far as the United States 
is concerned, the d m  always remains open for exhaustive discw 
sion and s e t b e n t  of our di&renux!' 
Five days later, on May g, Molotov replied. The Soviet Foreign 
Minister suggested "discussion and settlement of Mefences existing 
between us." But Washington rejected this proposal and the door, 
which Smith said was open, chcd with a bang. 
Less than two weeks later, on May 17, Soviet Premier Stalin re- 
plied to an open letter from Henry Wallace, at that time still a 
supporter of Rocscvtlt's policy of AmericanSoviet friendship. The 
former vict-praident urged that capitalism and socialism live t~ 
gether in pea= and differences be gelded through negotiations. 
Staiin answered Wallam: "The caexisttnce of these systems and 
the- pceful d c m t n t  of di&renccs between the USS.R, and the 
USA. are not only possible but absolutely necessary in the interests of 
universal peace." 
One of the most imprtant correspondents covering the Geneva 
parley was  jam^ R-n, chief of the N. Y. Times Washington 
Bureau. Which brings to mind a part of the record in which Reston 
himsel£ was a participant. 
Toward the end of 19, Reston sent a series of questions to Stalin. 
Ln one of them he asked if the Sovier Premier would agree to "diplo- 
matic conversations with representatives of the new Eisenhower ad- 
ministration, looking toward the possibility of a meeting between 
yourself and General Eisenhower on casing world tensions?" 
On December 21, Restan got a reply from Stalin in one word: 
Yes. But from the White House? Silence. 
Then Mdenkov tmk eke, after Stalin died. On March 15, 1 % ~  
I was sititing in the press box with my American, British and Fmch 
colleagues, at a meeting of the Supreme Soviet. Premier Malenkov 
was speaking and he said: 
"At the present time there is no disputed or unsolvtd problem 
which cannot be solved by peaceful means, on the h i s  of m u d  
agreement of the interested commies. This refers to our relations 
with all states, including our relations with tht United Statcs of 
America!' 
Just a few 4 s  Iattr, Prime Minister Churchill made it much 
more specific. H e  suggested a meeting the summit.n And on 
May I I, shody More I ldt the U.S.S.R., Prauda came out with a big 
story welcoming Churchill's ~roposal. Two years and more pasgcd 
without a meeting at the summit, ahhouqh Churchin proposed it time 
and again. Winston Churchill explained in Commons that while the 
Soviet Unim had accepted his proposal Eisenhower had vetted it. 
Clearly, the iduenm of McCarthy and Knowland was poisoning 
not only the domcstic atmosphere but also far&@ poliw. There must 
be no deals with the Soviet Union, they thundered. Thev ca1fed for 
"liberation" of the European Pcoplc's Democracies and China. They 
argued for preventive war, and the Eisenhower Administration a m e  
perilously dost to repeating their slogans when it urged '%liberationu 
and "massive rttaliatio~" 
Despite all this, a series of events took place which brought 
about an easinp of world tensions, thou& thh was intersnerml with 
the Tndochina crisis of r o w  and the Formosa crids this year. 
In the summer of x ~ q ,  the terrible fiahting in Rorea was ended bv 
ncmtiations. A year later the last shootins war in the world ended 
in Tnddina, dso through negotiations. Those neptiations algo taak 
place at Geneva and China participated as a p a t  power for the first 
time in that I= conference. 
Earlier this year, the long deadlocked Austrian state treaty was 
signed. And in Bandung, Indonesia, 3 Asian and African countries 
got together and agreed on peaceful coexisrence. It was at Baadung 
that China's Premier Chou En-lai made his dramatic proposal fox 
direct negotiations with our country to d e  the Far East crisis. 
There was a reconciliation between the Soviet Uniw and Y u p  
slavia. And the Soviet Union took the occasion to emphasize the m 
dalist principle of non-intervention by &list states in the affairs 
of other countrie. This principle had also k e n  stressed in five-pint 
coexistence agreements between China and India, Burma and India, 
I and other Asian lands. 
Then India's Prime Minister Nehru toured the U.S.S.R. Out of 
this visit came a big demonstration for peaceful coexisten= and non- 
intervention of countries in the internal affairs af others. 
But a l l  these events did not just fall fram the skies. Something 
new entered the field of diplomacy and world ah ir s .  The people, 
the plain ordinary John Docs and Mary Does, of all lands, were mak- 
ing their influence felt as never More in history. What was achieved 
at the summit w a s  made possible by what happened at the base. 
On a world scale, the forces of peace were strong than the war forces. 
An organized pace movement atose in every country which had 
a tremendous impact an the governments of the world. Think back 
to the critical situation in 1950. The Korean fighting broke out and 
many said the war must and wiH spread, It was five years ago that 
the Christmas issue of Newsweek magazine asked tbis question : "Is 
this the last Christmas of peace on tarth?" Its answer was: "Yes." 
But millions of people were at that time signing the Stockholm 
petition to ban atomic bombs. Millions of people were also demand- 
ing peaceful negotiations to bring a b u t  a cease-fire in Korea. In our 
own country, thousands of Etters 0oaded Washington and came to 
the editors of local newspapers with this demand. 
And still more miIIions all over the world signed petitions and held 
meetings and agitated for a big-power meeting at the summit. Steadily 
the demand grew for toplevel talks. During the British electian 
campaign this was a central issue. The Tories vied with the Labor 
Party as champions of a meeting at the summit. This was a great 
tribute to the common sense of the plain people who had ken de- 
manding this long before their leaders agreed to it. 
Pressure for such a meeting grew in our country, roo. ID order to 
forestall such a meeting, Secretary of State Dulles tried to pull a fast 
one. He ordered the release of the Yalta papers. 
DulIes' strategy was  as simple as it was nasty. The McCarthyim 
had lanq been using "Yalta" as a sort of dirty word with which to 
smear Roosevelr and the Demcxrats. So Dulfts released the papers, 
hoping to discredit the idea of a summit meeting. Since most post- 
Rmsevelt Democratic leaders no longer supported FDR's policy of 
6 
AmericanSoviet friendship, the field seemed wide open for the Dulles 
strategy. 
But thc release of the Y a h  papers boomeranged. Dulls had 
reckwed without one thin-puhr sentiment in our country favored 
a toplevel meeting. The Gallup poll had shown n percent in favor of 
a meeting of the Big Four heads of government The p p I e  were 
way ahcad of their socalled Ieaders. 
Meanwhile, some of the shrewder Dcrnocrats, including chairman 
Walter George of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, finally 
awoke to the Dulles scheme and to what the American people 
actually wanted. So Senator George followed up the release of the 
Yalta papers with a propad for a Big Four parley of the heads of 
government. 
The rest is very recent history. It includes n last-minute decision 
by Eisenhower to hdp out his Tory friends in the British election. 
So, finally he went along with Bulganin's agreement for a Big Four 
toplevel meeting, 
What the Geneva Big Four mecting accomplished is symbolized 
by the picture on thc cover of this pamphlet. The heads of the 
American, Soviet, British and French governments came together as 
friends, not enemies. A new spirit of rooperation and mutual con- 
fidence was indicated. 
From a practical point of view the Geneva conference decided to 
convene a mecting of the Big Four Foreign Ministers on October 
to take up the directives agreed upon by thc heads of state. 
A dramatic development that came right after the Geneva confer- 
ence was the announcement by the Chinese and American govern- 
ments that they were going to start negotiations in Geneva, This 
was follow~d, wen before the negotiations opened, by the release by 
the Peking government of eleven US. airmen. Qearly, the Geneva 
spirit was spilling over ro the Far East. The crisis there was a resuIt 
of a policy which gave the Knowland and McCarthy representatives 
nf F o r m a  a dangerbus influence over Far Eastern affairs. 
At Cairo, during the war, at Potsdam and later our government 
had recognized that Formosa was Chinese. And haw long can the 
fiction be maintained that Chiang Kai-shek speaks for China? New 
tiations between China and the U.S. were clearly in order. And they 
wen indeed initiated during the Big Four meeting in Geneva. . 
Each of the four heads of government-Eisenhower, Bulganin, 
E h  and Faure-has stressed the new atmosphere mated at Geneva. 
But still there remain sharp d;ffcrenms which rhc heads of state agreed 
to turn over to their foreign ministers for further study, negotiation 
and solution. Let's take up the three p in ts  on which the Geneva 
conference issued directives to the foreign ministers. Let's see what 
the differences are and whether solutions are possible which will 
satisfy the interests of all. 
r. EUROPEAN SECURITY AND GERMANY 
Nobody has to be remhded that Europe was ravaged by fire and 
sword for centuries. Whatever the other causes of those world wars, 
no one will dispute the specid part which Geman militarism played 
as an a$grtSSOr. And our country was involved in each world war. 
The dispute between the Weseera heads of state and the Soviet 
premier can be summed up very simply on tbis issue. The Wesrern 
position, in which our government took the lead, was that German 
"reunification" must have priority over any considerations of Euro- 
pean security. The Soviet position was that security and protection 
of aI1 against any attack is a basic condition for reunification of Ger- 
many. 
At the heart of the malIed  Western position was the rearma- 
ment of Wcst Germany and incorporation of the new Wehrmacht 
in NATO. A unified Germany would, in thii position, also be re- 
militarized and become part of the NATO military alliance. 
Turning to the record we find rhat on June q, 1949, shortly after , 
the North Atlantic Treaty was signal, the Soviet Union protested 
that it had been excluded. And later, the Swict governmenr, on March 1 
31, sgtii, sent us a note proposing "to join with the interested govern- . 
mats  in mamining the question af the Soviet Union's participation 
in the North Atlantic Treaty." 
This brings ta mind a series of compromise proposals made bath 
by the British and Soviet governments at Geneva. Bulganin several 
times went out of his way to stress that he was not proposing to break 
up NATO. Instead, he suggested agreements on consultation and non- 
aggression between NATO and the Warsaw pact. [The latter was 
formed as a counterweight ro NATO by the Soviet government and 
the East European People's Democracies six years after NATO was 
crcatcd.] 
Bulganin proposed this as part of a first stage for solving the pr& 
Ian  of German unification and &-European security. In the h a 1  
 stag^, therc would be a collective security pact of all Europe, including 
a united Germany and the USA. This would then be able to repface 
the military allianceeNAT0 and Warsaw-now facing one anorher 
in Europe. 
Sir Anthony Edm then proposed a five-power security pact to in- 
clude the Big Four and a united Germany. Eden showed he was 
ready for compromise in his smtcmcnt that this pact might be mlargcd 
to include other European states. And Bulganin showed he was ready 
for compromise in saying he was willing to consider fewer than all 
che states of Europe in the paa. 
Many in Geneva were startled by President Eisenhower's explana- 
tion that NATO was formed to prevent the rise of Hitlerism in Ger- 
many. No one was more surprised than the West Germans. It was 
espdally startling in view of a dispatch sent from Bonn, Germany, 
by the Associated Press at the very time when Eisenhower was making 
that statement. The dispatch, as it appeared in the Christian Science 
Mmitor (July w), stated: 
"The West German government has informed parliament of its 
plan to take over the American-heed international spy network 
htaded by former Lt. Gen. Reinhard Gcblen. 
'Tt will b m e  the West German federal indigence service, op- 
erating on both sides of the Iron Curtah, 
"Financed for the last tight years with up to six mittion dollars 
of United States funds, the GeHm organization has agents, 
some operating as far east as Siberia." 
What a strange way of preventing the rise of Hirlerism! Lt. Gcn. 
Gelden of the Nazi High Cotnmand operated intelIigcncc for= 
against American troops who fought under General Eisenhower a 
little more than ten years ago. And Lt. Gen. Gehlen was Hider's 
most trusted operative against the Soviet Union. His Hitleritc net- 
work, which was "American-financed," is now part of Adcnaucr's 
forces, and is &ng proposed for inclusion in NATO. 
Is it any wonder that right after the Geneva conference, the Social 
&mcrats and the trade union federation of West Grmany under- 
taok a new egort to bar the incorporation of the proposed new Wchr- 
macht in NATO? These- German trade unions have for ten years 
been backed by the AFL and CIO, fmancially and otherwise, Shouldn't 
American trade unionists pay some heed to what rheu German broth- 
ers are saying now? These German unionists are warning that re- 
vived militarism would h disastrous for free trade unions. 
HOW can Germany be united, the West German workers ask, if 
we insist that not only West Germany, but a united Germany must: 
became part of NATO? The question before us, the Social Demo- 
aats said, is to discuss a basis for reunification under which West 
Germany wuId not h committed to NATO and East Germany 
would not be committed to Warsaw. 
The manner in which the Geneva conference tied together the 
questions of European security and German unification shows there 
are braad areas for compromise on both sides and solution af this 
Jificult problem is possible. 
a. DISARMAMENT 
For ten ymrs, the costs of armaments have pressed more and more 
heavily on people everywhere, The mnev  we have spent on financing 
the cold war could have provided decent housing for everv American 
family. It could have built enough ahnols to eliminate a11 sub-stand- 
3rd educational facilities. It could have provided the recreational fa- 
cilities and supervised youth activities to help combat the terrible 
m u r q  of iuvenile delinquency which has mounted steadily during 
the years of the cold war. It cadd have provided an effective flood 
control program. 
Across every issue arising in the past-war world has k e n  the 
shadow of the A-bombs and Hhrnb, True, the forces of peace have 
proved stronger than the hrccs of war even in the most critical post- 
war years. But as long as there was a Cold War, it could nurture 
atomic destruction at mmt future date. 
That is why the peace movement, church assemblies, Pope Pius XI1 
--all have appealed far banishing the horror bomb menace, 
At Geneva, the four powers agreed to spur the efforts of their 
representatives on the UN disarmament submmission. Their rep 
rescntatives in that body, as well as the foreign ministers, are in- 
structed to take into account the proposals made by the heads of gov- 
ernment. 
Great attention was gven in the world press to President Em- 
hawergs proposal that the US, and U.SS,R. exchange defense in- 
I 
stallation blue prints. AEo, that they sponsor aerial flights over each 
other's amtries "from end ro end." 
After the dust had sertled somewhat, the question was how much 
had this contributed to disarmament? James Reston, of the N. Y. 
Time$ (July 22, 1 % ~ ) ~  noted : 
First, "it was generally reqardtd as unrealistic." 
Second. "it is illem1 under United States laws." 
Third, it is a proposal "which the other side knew in advance had 
no chance of being accepted." 
And fourth, the plan, "apparently was not explored in any detail, 
if at all, with Con~ressional leaders, who make the laws." 
What was extraordinary about Eisenhower's speech was that while 
it was an the s u b k t  of disarmament, it contained no propnsal for arms 
reduction or limitation at all. In fact, the President stated that the 
measures which he was proposing would be ineffective in the check- 
ine or insnection of nuclear weapons. 
The President said he would consent to arms reduction or bans 
only if inspection or testing could be effective. Then he said: 
'We have pot hen  able to discover any xientitic or other inqnec- 
tion method which would make certain of the elimination of nuclear 
F weapons." In other words, he is saying that his own proposal brinvs 
I no closer a method of eliminating nuclear weapons. 
b 
Evidence of the new and better relations between our wuntw and 
the USSR was seen in the Soviet attitude toward the Eisenhower 
proposal. The Soviet leaders did not reject or rebuff it even though 
it does not include any reference to banning atomic bombs at reduc- 
inrr conventional arms. Thcy suggested that it be considerd, along 
with atI other propasaIs, as a serious contribution. 
In other words, even areas where there are great differences ean 
become areas of agreement in the new climate of Soviet-American 
relations. That is why friendship between the two most powerful 
countries in the world is so important to all of us, + 
It is interesting, by way of contrast, that Prernicr Bulganin ac- 
cepted a proposal of the Bandung conference to ban all nudear wcap 
on test explosions. This is something that definitely can bc chtclrtd. 
It was originally proposed by William Randolph Hearst to Marshal 
Zhukw. Mow, it pops up in a S o d  proposal to which we had no 
p&tivc respon~.  
Another interesting sidetight was the Soviet acceptance of the 
Eisenhower pmpasal to contribute atomic materials to a world atomic 
pool for peace. 
Premier Bulganin also repeated the Soviet plan for disarmament 
and the prohibition of nudear weapons which his government origi- 
nally propod on May 10. Prim Minister Eden, in commenting 
on this at Geneva, noted that it brought the East and West much closer 
together on this issue. 
The Soviet Union accepted the Western proposab on levels of 
armaments. It accepted thc Western proposals of a stage-by-stage 
approach ro banning nuclear weapons. And the Soviet plan mnmins 
a detailed system of international inspection to enforce a nucltar 
weapon ban as we11 as the reduction of conventional armaments. 
It is not generally realized that this Soviet plan on inspec~on and 
mntrol d m  not provide for any veto in the day-to-day operations 
of the international inspection agency. The internationaI agency is 
authorized to conduct inspections ar any time by a simple majority 
vote and it must be allowed a m s  to all "objects of control." 
The issue, from tht viewpoint of our best interests, is not disarma- 
ment versus inspection. The salution of this problem will require 
disarmament AND inspection. To pit one against the other is to bar 
the way to what the world and our country n e e d e a  ban on nuclear 
weapons, lifring of the armaments burden, along with security for all. 
3. DEVELOPMENT OF CONTACT BEIWEEN 
EAST AND WEST 
Of breaching benefit in developing mutual good feeling was the 
agreement of the Big Four to bring about: 
r. Elimination of barriers to free communicatio~. and trade bc- 
tween East a d  West 
a Freer contacts and exchanges. 
It may still come as a shock to many Americans that our govern- 
ment has erected barriers between pmples. Many may bc surprised 
to Icarn that at present the Soviet Union sells us ten times as much 
goods as we sell them. And we arc sure mast people wodd be 
a d  to learn that as late as ISI, when we had cut off practicaliy 
all exports to the thevict Union, they were still selling us such strategic 
materials as manganese and chrome, Those p u r b  from the 
U.S.S.R. went into tanks, d e r y  and other ordnance. But at that 
very time we were banning the sale of penicillin, pssmger  cars, trac- 
tors and fishing boats, dong with a thowand other such item9, w the 
U.S.S.R. and any of the other h a l i s t  lands. 
Similarly with regard to travel and cultural excbangc between East 
and West. Many Americans will be surprised to learn &at ordinary 
tourist travel is b d y  under way between Europe and the USSR. 
And h e  newspapermen, c o n p m e n ,  sportsmen, farmers and stu- 
dents who have visited the Soviet Union haw not been asked far 
their fingerprints or told to sign a statement that they travel at their 
own risk, as is the case under the McCarran-Walter Act. 
It is important for every American to know how much our 
country's name has sdered abroad because of the passport ban we've 
placed on Paul Robeson. Tories from London and Catholics in Pram 
told me they want to see R o b n  in Othello and hear him sing. 
The wonderful weIcome which the Midwest and Far West farmers 
gave to the Soviet farm delegation here and the fine reception our 
farmers got in the USSR. show how ordinary people want to brcak 
down barriers to East-Wet friendship. AFL President George M a y  
is out of step with his own membership when he opposes the exchange 
of l a h r  delegations. And Democratic Senator Ellender scored a 
b&ye when he went to Mmcow and there sent a message to Gaorge 
Many urging lahr  ddegations to exchange visits. "They might see 
things in a different light," Ellender said to the AFL leaders. 
Which brings up the whole question of the witchhunt and anti- 
Communist hysteria. One of the moat terrible consequena of the 
cold-war foreign policy of the Truman and Eisenhower Adminisma- 
tions was the witchhunt. Only now dots it become clear what a heavy 
price our country paid for a disastrous foreign policy. Entire ch& 
of our most cherished traditions and constitutional guarantees were 
cut away under the pretext of an "external menace" and the hoax of 
a "world communist conspiracy." 
This was the meat on which McCarthyism fed. How happy people 
all over the world were to repeat a phrase they had heard--that Mc- 
Carthyism had become MeCarthywasm. That s y m b o l i d  an ending 
of the Cold War to them. 
But can it be said that McCadyism is already a thing of the past? 
How can it, when right after Geneva we read reports in all Euro- 
pean papers about che Un-American investigation of actors and 
theatrical figures for their "subversive" connections. 
McCarthyism is sri l l  with us, though McCarthy hirnstlf is dik 
credited, as long as men and women are jailed for heir political b 
Iiefs under the Smith and the McCarran laws. Elizabeth GurIty 
FIynn, yo years a leader of American labor, is now in prison under the 
Smith Act along with many others. The texrible irony about this 
is that Miss Flynn and her =workers championed the idea of a 
"meeting at the summit" when both the Truman and then the Eisen- 
hower Adrninistrarion bitterly opposed it. 
But observe how history has vindicated those who said negotia- 
tions between East and West are both possible and necessary; how 
those who demanded a big power conference were correct, while those 
who sponsored the Cold War were harming our munay's interests. 
The cold war was profitable for a tiny minority. Wall Street 
hrrns, which had made TO billion dollars profit annually after taxes 
during World War II, raised that to a6 billion a year during the 
Cold War. 
But at Geneva the voice of the people proved irresistible. The 
dunand for peace crept in through every door, every window and 
every crevice of the Palace of the Nations. h was a voice which said 
mankind will tolerate war na more. Geneva was a triumph for the 
idea of p d u l  cwxistence. 
How big a part the American people played in bringing abut 
the present improvement of the world situation could be seen in the 
popular protest at every phony crisis m k d  up by the war patty. 
. -- - 
Testimony to this is giwn by Walar 
Herald-Tribune drlmn (Aug, 2) 
h e n  the threat of war over such an absurdity as Quuwy ad &&tm 
which was the trigger that get off the Ammian rtvulsian a@h@s , - - 
tbird World War." 
h that same column, Lipprnann confirms that '*even as h laat 
January" President Eisenhower "felt mmpdd ta a- than [tb 
war party) considerably+" 
Geneva was a triumph lor the idea of eeac$ul It ww 
not a "sixday wonder." It brought abut wonduful hq~~ in &X 
days, but wbat happened in the ten years bdorc madc Geneva p .. 
sible. The real origin of Geneva was in the great victory over Wix- 
lerism in World War II which profoundly dtcrd rehiom among 
the power& Lt wasl a victory of American-Soviet cooperah Ad 
after that victory every &rt to insrig.ate another World War m 
up against h new relations. Above all, they came up asainst the 
people everywhere who wanted no such war. 
How wise the people were when they s u p p o d  a Big Four 
meeting even though the Ahhimation in Washington opposed i t  
How wise the people were when they a p d  great hopes &at the 
Geneva meeting would succeed although the Administration warnad 
against such h o p  and poured cold water on such expectations. 
And now once more h e  Administration is trying to curb the m- 
thusiasm of tht peoplt about the spirit of C;eawa. On August a5 
the newspapers p u b h d  a speech by Resident E i d o w e r  at Phila- 
delphia in which he cautioned against the pop& hopes aroused by 
Geneva. James Reston said in the N. Y. Timeb: 
"The Eisenhower Administration has reached a policy decision 
to put a brakc on the optimism c r d  by the Big Four conference 
last month in Geneva!' 
But the need today is not for a brake but for a spur to the Geneva 
spirit. If the popular expeaations and demands in this matter are 
impressed on Washington, then the spirit of Gcneva will &our&. 
Geneva was the &st big step in ending the #ld War. And as 
Americans remain dm and s p k  out for patient negotiations, on 
a t m w a y  street, their will for peace will prove decisive. 
# . . 
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